We analyze industrial espionage in the context of entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent, who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an inaccurate Intelligence System. The Intelligence System generates a noisy signal on incumbent's actions and the potential entrant decides whether to enter based on this signal. If the precision of the Intelligence System is commonly known, the incumbent will signal-jam to manipulate the distribution of likely signals and hence the entrant's decisions. Therefore, the incumbent will benefit from his rival's espionage. In contrast, the spying firm (the entrant) will typically gain if the espionage accuracy is sufficiently high and privately known by her. In this setting, the market will be more competitive under espionage.
Introduction.
An important part of firm information is relative to other firms and it may be about production processes and techniques, costs, recipes and formulas, costumer datasets, actions, decisions, plans and strategies, etc 1 . But firms do not always get information ethically and legally. The illegal and unethical process of getting information about other firms is called industrial espionage 2 . Industrial espionage has a large history and during the last few years, the more competitive environment based on knowledge and the advances in communication and information technologies have increased firms' incentive to exceed the limits of competitive intelligence activities. As a result, industrial espionage has become an important, even worrying, business practice. For instance, according to 1997 US State Department and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Reports, industrial espionage costs US business over 8.16 billion dollar annually. Moreover, 43% of American firms have had at least six incidents of industrial espionage 3 , embracing various activities in order to achieve cost advantages, to maintain market leadership, and the like. The issue is becoming so important that, one of the leaders of a recent The Economist (21 st of February), analyzes China's cybercrime under the title "China's cyber-hacking. Getting ugly," where it is said that some criminal tribes operate inside the target multinational firm and misappropriate its resources, while others use purloined property and know-how to start rival businesses after (or even before) leaving the firm. precision is common knowledge, only the incumbent will benefit from his rival's espionage activities. He rather uses his first mover advantage to signal-jam, or to strategically choose his actions, to manipulate the distribution of likely signals and hence the likely inferences drawn by the entrant. By correlating his actions with the precision of the spying technology, the incumbent is able to influence on the entrant's decision. In contrast, when only the entrant has private information of the signal precision, she uses both her private knowledge and her second mover advantage to correlate her action with that of the incumbent and benefit from espionage. The incumbent will signal-jam again using the expectation of the precision as a proxy for its true value. However, the entrant cannot be manipulated as before and, for some values of the precision, she makes equilibrium entry decisions independently of the signal received.
Although entry deterrence has been extensively studied in the literature 4 , the effects of espionage on this context have not yet been analyzed. Market entry is one of the most fundamental decisions a firm has to make and so is the incumbent's reaction before the threat of entry
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. One of the possible incumbent's responses to deter entry is to invest in capacity expansion. Examples of strategic capacity expansion can be the famous one of the titanium dioxide industry (see Ghemawat, 1984 and Hall, 1990 ) and the "sleeping patents" of the bio-pharmaceutical industries and/or Airline companies (see Sull, 1999) among others.
The classical and stylized model of entry deterrence by capacity expansion assumes the existence of a monopoly incumbent and a potential entrant to the market. Under perfect information and sequential moves the entrant stays out if the incumbent's capacity is expanded and enters otherwise. However, capacity expansion requires an investment and in the real world the entrant does not observe ex-ante the incumbent's decision of whether to invest in capacity. Hence, the entrant enters only if she believes that with high probability the capacity was not expanded. 4 For a survey of this literature see Wilson (1992 However, when the spy is a decision maker who can act strategically then double crossing may appear (see Ho, 2008) . To avoid these strategic effects it is assumed that the entrant operates a costless Intelligence System (IS) which is set to detect the incumbent's action. This could be the case if a firm had already a spying technology before it encounters a new rival, for instance, the potential entrant could have the ability to introduce a Trojan horse in the computer system of the monopoly incumbent and obtain information about the action he plans to take. Today, the use of Trojan horse computer viruses for industrial espionage is a real practice. For instance, in 2005 three top-tier Israeli firms were suspected to use them in Israel to monitor competition in the cable industry, communications, office-equipment, photocopy, cars and trucks 6 .
The IS sends out one of two signals. One signal, labeled i, indicating that the incumbent invests in new capacity and another signal, labeled ni, indicating the opposite. The IS has a precision, this meaning that the signal sent by the IS will be correct with a probability equal to the IS precision. Based on the signal received, the entrant decides whether or not (or with what probability) to enter the market.
Let us start with the benchmark case where the precision of the IS is commonly known.
That is, when the incumbent knows his computer system is infected with a Trojan horse and how much information the potential entrant obtains through it 7 . Since the entrant only observes a signal from the IS and takes an action, this allows the incumbent to advantageously signal-jam or choose his capacity expansion probability, to influence on the conditional probability that the entrant enters, given the signal received. Consider 8 that the investment cost is low enough such that the incumbent would prefer to invest if he knew that the entrant would enter. If, for instance, the precision of the IS is relatively high, the incumbent, will know that if he does not expand capacity, the entrant will detect this with high probability and she will likely enter. Hence, the incumbent will expand his capacity with high probability, and then the signal ni will be less likely to occur. Consequently, when the entrant observes the signal ni , she will no longer rely on its accuracy and she will rather stay out with positive probability, while if she observes signal i will stay out with probability one. As the IS precision increases, the probability of the signal ni and the conditional probability that the entrant enters given ni decreases. Therefore, the incumbent signaljams by expanding capacity with a positive probability that is increasing in the IS precision. Alternatively, if the IS precision is less accurate, the incumbent will expands capacity with smaller probability, knowing that there will be a good chance that his action will not be detected. Furthermore, he will expand capacity with a positive probability that is decreasing in the IS precision, in order to decrease the unconditional probability that the entrant enters. The incumbent will benefit from the IS more than its owner, the entrant, if the IS is relatively accurate.
Next we analyze the asymmetric information case where the IS precision is private information to the entrant. The incumbent only knows the distribution of this precision and believes with positive probability that the entrant is operating an IS 9 . He will signal-jam at the (Bayesian) equilibrium by following the expectation of the precision as a proxy for its real value. However, the entrant cannot be as easily fooled as before because she knows the true value of the precision and compares it with its expectation.
She plays pure strategies and, for some values of the precision, takes an entry decision independently of the signal received. Namely, if the expected precision of the IS is not too high, the incumbent will believe that the true precision is low and with high 8 We leave aside the case where the investment cost is sufficiently high so that the incumbent would prefer not to invest even if he knew that the entrant would enter.
probability he will not expand capacity believing that the entrant will not likely detect him. Then the entrant, following the more likely signal, ni , will enter the market irrespective of the actual precision. On the other hand, if the expected precision of the IS is high enough, the incumbent will believe now that the true precision is relatively high and the entrant will likely detect his action. Hence, the incumbent expands his capacity with relatively high probability, and the entrant, following the less likely signal, ni , will enter the market if the actual precision is relatively high and will not enter otherwise. If the signal is i, the entrant does not enter irrespectively of the IS precision. The entrant obtains positive payoff if the IS precision is sufficiently large and this payoff is increasing in this precision while the incumbent will be better off when the IS is not relatively accurate.
Therefore when espionage activities are undertaken with noise, the spied upon incumbent always practice signal-jamming, and he will be more successful in manipulating the entrant signals the more knowledge he has of the spying technology accuracy. When, instead, the IS accuracy is only the entrant's private information and the information is very asymmetric, market competition is increased because the entrant enters most of the times. Furthermore, the incumbent invest less in capacity making the market more efficient.
Related Literature
The paper is related to several research strands. The first strand is concerned with papers on industrial espionage. Solan and Yariv (2004) A third limit pricing/signaling strand develops two period models of entry deterrence where firms have private information about demand or cost and take actions (limit pricing) that influence the inference of other firms. In the limit pricing models of Harrington (1986 Harrington ( , 1987 , Caminal (1990) , and Mailath (1989) , etc., an incumbent's price duopoly or duopoly prices signal information about the costs of an entrant.
Finally, the paper is related with the sharing information in oligopoly markets as in Vives (1984) , Raith (1996) , and Gal-Or (1985, 1986, 1988) , among others, where the equilibrium outcomes can be solved for conditional on the information revealed.
The next section sets out the basic model. In section 3 we analyze the Nash equilibrium of the entry game with espionage when the IS precision is commonly known. Section 4 is devoted to find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies when the IS precision is the entrant's private information. Section 5 concludes the paper
The basic model.
There are two firms, M and E. The Incumbent Firm, M, is a monopolist and E is a potential entrant
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. In an attempt to deter E from entering M considers whether to invest or not to invest in a new capacity. E has an Intelligence System (IS) that monitors the action of M. The IS sends a noisy signal, one of the two signals i or ni . The signal i
indicates that M invests and the signal ni indicates that M does not invest. The IS sends the right signal with probability  and the wrong signal with probability1   .
For simplicity we assume that the precision,  , of the IS is independent of the action of
  , the IS is of no relevance and if
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  , the IS is perfect. The following tree summarizes the above:
Figure 1
Based on the signal received E decides whether or not to enter the market.
The following table describes the payoffs of the two firms based on their possible actions:
Figure 2 10 With an abuse of notation, the letter E is used to denote the entrant, the action "enter" and also for expectations later on. However, no confusion should arise.
, which is decreasing in both b and c . Namely, the higher is the payoff of M from expanding capacity the lower is the probability that E enters.
The payoff of E is zero (E is indifferent between entering and not entering), and the
(which increases in b and c ).
The second case is 1   and M's action is perfectly detected by E. In this case, E chooses her action based on M's action. This game can be described by the following tree:
Figure 3
A perfect signal allows the Incumbent take advantages as a leader in a sequential game and the backward induction is the unique Nash equilibrium. M expands his capacity and E does not enter the market. This outcome yields a higher payoff for M than the equilibrium outcome for 1 2   . The payoff of E is zero in both two cases. Hence, only M benefits from a perfect IS. The entrant, who spies on M and who is able to perfectly monitor M's action (before taking her action) does not benefit at all from using it. This result follows by the assumption that  is commonly known.
The general case:
The entrant has four pure strategies. A pure strategy of E is a pair   , x y where both x and y are in   , E NE , x is the action of E if she observes the signal ni and y is her action if she observes the signal i . The following figure describes the game,  G , between M and E in strategic form (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 ):
Figure 4
For instance, the strategy   The intuition is as follows. When 1 c b   (see Figure 2) , the cost of making a mistake for M is larger when E enters than when E does not enter. Note that in this case 12 Note that when E chooses her strategy   with relatively high probability. Actually, this probability is shown to be equal to the precision  of the IS and since 1 2
  E expects to observe signal i with higher probability than signal ni . As a result, E will stay out for sure if she observes the signal i and E will hesitate if she observes the less expected signal ni . In the latter case E will mix her two pure actions. The higher is the precision  of the IS the higher is the probability that M invests and the higher is the probability that E stays out. M knows that his action will be correctly detected with high probability. Therefore he expects that if he did not expand capacity, E would likely enter. Hence, M expands his capacity with high probability, in fact with probability . Consequently, the signal ni is not likely to occur. If E observed this signal, she would not trust and would update her belief about M's action. As a result, she would not enter with positive probability.
On the other hand, E expects the signal i and when she observes it, she trusts its accuracy and does not enter with probability 1.
If the precision of the IS is not too accurate ( 1 2     ), M assigns significant probability that his action will not be accurately detected. Therefore, in an attempt to conceal his action, M mixes his two strategies I and NI, both with significant probabilities (1   and  respectively). Thus both signals i and ni have reasonable likelihood to occur. However the signal ni is more likely than the signal i since 1     . As a result E will enter with probability 1 if the signal is ni and will randomize her actions if the signal is i .
An increase in the quality  of the IS increases the reliability of the signal generated.
Hence, when E observes the signal i she enters the market with lower probability and M is better off. Less intuitive is the fact that as  increases M invests with lower probability and reduces the probability of the signal i . However, we argue that this decreases the probability that E enters, as we show in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.
Consider the equilibrium of  G . Then, the probability that E enters the market is positive and decreasing in  for all
If the precision of the IS is not too accurate ( 1 2     ), M expands capacity with probability decreasing in  . This behavior of M implies that the increase of  has two opposite effects on the unconditional probability that E enters. The positive effect is the increase of the probability of the signal ni , which contributes to the increase of the probability that E enters (E enters with probability 1 when she observes the signal ni ).
On the other hand, it decreases the conditional probability that E enters given i , which contributes to the decrease of the probability that E enters. It turns out that the latter effect outweighs the positive effect and as a result the unconditional probability that E enters decreases in  . Similarly, If the precision of the IS is relatively accurate ( 1     ), M will expand capacity with probability increasing in  . Hence, as  increases, the probability of the signal ni and the conditional probability that E enters given ni decrease. This implies that the unconditional probability that E is decreasing in  . The proposition implies that E is better off the higher is the precision of the IS as long as it is smaller than  (see Figure 6) . Let E  be the equilibrium expected payoff of E.
Figure 6
Which is the explanation of figure 6 ? By Proposition 1, if 1 2
, E E and   , E NE . Moreover, in equilibrium the Entrant will enter the market with probability 1 if the signal is ni , and with some probability (see the Appendix) if the signal is i . Furthermore, by Proposition 1, at this interval, the Incumbent will randomize between expanding and not expanding its capacity with probability decreasing in  . The effect is the increase of the probability of the signal ni , which contributes to the increase of the Entrant's expected payoff from playing (E,E). Since she plays a mixed strategy, her expected payoffs from playing (E,E) are the same than those from playing (E,NE), and the former are clearly increasing in α.
Therefore even though the probability that E enters the market is decreasing in  , the To sum up, when the Incumbent knows the value of  (namely, it is common knowledge), he signal-jams using the IS precision as a correlation device and benefits from his rival's espionage. This signal-jamming activity is inefficient for the market, since it may imply an excess of capacity. Therefore, an important question is whether espionage activities enhance market efficiency, as compared with no espionage, when the IS precision is common knowledge. The answer is affirmative only if the IS precision is small enough ( 1 2     ). In this interval, the incumbent signal-jamming strategy forces him to invest less in capacity to decrease the unconditional probability that the Entrant enters. This behavior increases the probability of the signal ni and hence the Entrant´s profits. As a consequence, both firms are better off which is Pareto improving and the capacity of the market is more efficient that under no espionage.
Asymmetric information about the precision of the IS.
In this section we assume that the precision  of the IS is the private information of its owner, E. The Incumbent, who doesn't know  , assigns a continuous density Let M u and E u be the utilities of the two firms from the various outcomes. As in the previous section (see Figure 2) , it is assumed that
is the expected quality of the IS from the perspective of the uninformed M.
The next proposition shows that at the (Bayesian equilibrium) the incumbent signaljams again, using the expectation of the precision, and that the Entrant follows a pure strategy. Notice that unlike the case where  is commonly known, the equilibrium strategy of E of type  is a pure action (enter or not enter the market with probability 1). However, M mixes his two pure actions to signal-jam, similarly to the common knowledge case.
The action of E depends on both the expected and the actual precision of the IS. If the expected precision of IS does not exceed  , M will believe that the true IS precision is low and with high probability he will not expand capacity believing that E will not likely detect him. Then E, following the more likely signal ni , will enter the market irrespective of the actual precision. Furthermore, E will enter the market even if she receives the signal i and if the actual precision  is relatively small (
otherwise she will not enter. If on the other hand, the expected precision of the IS exceeds  , M will believe that the true precision is relatively high and E will likely detect his action. Hence, M will expand his capacity with relatively high probability, and E, following the less likely signal ni , will enter the market if the actual precision is relatively high ( former M invest with low probability believing that E is not likely to detect him.
The next proposition describes the equilibrium payoff of M.
Proposition 6.
Consider the equilibrium of  . Then,
, and it is strictly increasing if
and is strictly decreasing for If the expected precision of the IS is relatively high and M invests with high probability
, his payoff will be increasing because the more accurate the IS is the more likely is that the IS generates signal i , inducing E to stay out. But, if he invests with relatively low probability (
), it will not be likely that the IS generates signal i and his payoff will decrease. However, even when M invests with high probability, his expected equilibrium payoff is greater when exists a chance that she enters the market. Hence, M will be best off when E does not spy on him or when the IS has a low accuracy.
If, on the contrary, the IS expected precision is low but the IS is quite accurate
p     ), the equilibrium payoff of M will be decreasing in  because in this case with high probability M will not expand capacity believing that E will not likely detect him, and then, as  becomes larger E will more likely detect M's action and will enter. But, even though the payoff of M is decreasing in this region, it is greater when the IS is less accurate ( Hence, M prefers E to spy on him, but with an IS which is not perfect. Actually, the closer  is to What the market has gained from espionage under asymmetric information?
Obviously it depends on how asymmetric is the information. When information is very asymmetric, that meaning that the IS precision is high but the Incumbent beliefs are wrong (the IS expected precision is lower than some threshold), market competition is increased because the Entrant enters most of the times. Furthermore, the Incumbent invest less in capacity making the market more efficient. On the contrary, when the IS precision is high and the Incumbent beliefs are aligned (the IS expected precision is high enough), the Entrant will enter with smaller probability and the Incumbent will expand capacity with higher probability than in the previous case. The higher the IS precision the better is the Entrant because she can detect M's action with a relatively accurate precision and choose her strategy accordingly.
Concluding remarks.
In spite of the importance for a potential entrant to obtain information about the incumbent(s) firm(s), the effects of espionage on entry deterrence models have not been studied before in the literature. Our paper makes a first step in this direction, but more research needs to be done.
In this paper we have considered a model where a potential entrant uses an inaccurate
Intelligence System (IS), of a given precision, to spy upon a monopoly incumbent and detect his decision of whether to expand capacity. Taking into account this information, the entrant takes entry decisions.
It could be expected that more precise information would always benefit the entrant, but we have showed that, if the precision of the spying technology is commonly known to both firms, then only the incumbent will benefit from a perfect IS while the entrant will prefer a less accurate one. However, when the IS precision is the Entrant's private information, she can avoid being completely manipulated by the incumbent's signal-jamming, and, in fact, for some values of the precision, she will make equilibrium entry decisions independently of the signal. Raith (1996) , Gal-Or (1985 , 1988 , about sharing information in oligopoly markets, where letting the rivals acquire a better knowledge of their profits functions leads to a higher correlation of strategies.
Industrial espionage has become an increasing business practice. While espionage is considered an illegal and unethical activity it has the potential to yield desirable strategic effects and/or profits-shifting effects in markets with entry barriers.
Do espionage activities enhance market competition? The answer depends on the asymmetry of the information about the accuracy of the spying activity. If the IS precision is common knowledge, there will be small room for spying activities. Only if this precision is small enough, the Incumbent's probability of expanding capacity will be lower than in the case of not spying, making the market more efficient. When, instead, the IS accuracy is high enough and the Entrant's private information, and the information is very asymmetric, market competition is increased because the Entrant enters most of the times. Spying will also be beneficial to consumers because typically the expected market output will rise, the expected price will fall and the expected consumer surplus will be enlarged.
Which are the main policy implications? Should espionage be completely banned?
From the above results it can only be said that whether espionage is a virtue or a vice (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999) is still an open question which needs much more research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to verify that the unique Nash equilibrium strategy of M is to invest with probability p , s.t.
  
